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UNA SOLUCIÓ, SI US PLAU: SELF-DETERMINATION AND
THE CATALAN CRISIS
ABSTRACT
Nestled in the corner of Spain is the birthplace of a people and a political
conflict as old as the history of the peninsula itself. Catalonia, long a bastion for
independence movements around the world, is caught at the center of tensions
between traditional regionalism and political centrality in Spain. As internal
unrest continues to intensify, miring discussion and dialogue, the crisis creeps
closer to a point of drastic political uncertainty. Exhausted with the enduring
lethargy of domestic and European legal fora, the Catalans have often thought
of turning to international law for a solution. This Comment draws upon decades
of scholarship in the realm of self-determination to argue for a critical reanalysis of these now-dated concepts. Formulated in response to a post-colonial
era, the mechanism of self-determination fails to ascertain and address the
challenges faced by modern ethnopolitical minorities. A reassessment of the
norms of self-determination could provide novel and politically stabilizing
options for stateless groups in Europe and other parts of the world.
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INTRODUCTION
Greuge in Catalan means “grievance” or “affront.”1 This is a word at the
core of the Catalonian character, a word branded on the lips and hearts of those
struggling for independence in the region for hundreds of years.2 The willful
obliviousness towards Catalan culture and its concerns, the neglect, and often
deliberate ill-treatment of the region and its people have festered in the collective
national memory. Unaddressed grievances, unsettled affronts, and an utter
failure of communication are now an essential part of the makeup of the Catalan
people, their land, their pátria3 and its relationship with greater Spain. These
grievances, their seemingly interminable nature, and the search for a solution are
the subject of this Comment.
This is a conflict about language, history, and the failure to settle upon a
cohesive national narrative. The pluri-nationalism of modern Spain is a dizzying
descendant of a nation haunted by violent twentieth century totalitarianism,
1
Greuge (Catalan), WORDSENSE.EU ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.wordsense.eu/greuge (last
visited Oct. 24, 2020).
2
J.H. ELLIOTT, SCOTS AND CATALANS: UNION AND DISUNION 179 (2018).
3
Id.; Pátria (Catalan), CATALAN DICTIONARY, http://www.catalandictionary.org/en/search (last visited
June 11, 2021).
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which only exacerbated centuries of confused attempts at bureaucratic nationbuilding amongst the country’s many regions. The political idea that Spain relies
on is a kind of “dual nationalism,” comprising of a loyalty to one’s region and
the nation of Spain. For a country creeping ever closer to neo-Francoist rhetoric
in its political dialogue,4 the Catalonian independence crisis represents a key
moment for the future of Spain. This moment hinges on a fragile balance
between the anti-regionalist rhetoric of the Vox party5 and the pro-independence
groups of the Catalan secessionists.6 The contemporaneous demands for
separatism, and the subsequent instability resulting from the region’s clash with
the central government in Madrid, retrogresses an already historically tenuous
situation.
Amidst this startling backdrop, one would assume international law would
lend some method of relief: either by custom, action, or at least advocacy. This
Comment hopes to gauge why this is unfortunately not the case for the Catalan
situation and to offer a potential remedy for an international legal tool that has
proven ineffective. Every further action by the Spanish State, in its unfailing
resistance and steadfast unwillingness to compromise, further atrophies the
already-weakening emotional ties that the region has towards the central
government. This tension was a key factor in driving Spain to a civil war less
than a century ago, and with the internal situation habitually embittered and
motionless, the need for external aid is now.
This is a complex problem which requires all the support international law
can lend. This Comment will point out areas in which international law must be
refined to assuage problems like the ones faced by the Catalans. Part I will begin
by focusing on the local situation of Catalonia in Spain before expanding into
international legal obligations under the law of the European Union (EU) in Part
II. Finally, this Comment will address to what extent international law speaks to
this issue and how its principles may remedy a situation at a standstill in Part III.
Ultimately, this Comment attempts to posit three central claims. First, that the

4
See Anne Applebaum, Want to Build a Far-Right Movement? Spain’s Vox Party Shows How, WASH.
POST (May 2, 2019), https://www.anneapplebaum.com/2019/05/02/want-to-build-a-far-right-movement-spainsvox-party-shows-how; Thomas Rubio, Franco’s Legacy Animates Spain’s Vox Party, WASH. POST (May 15,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/francos-legacy-animates-spains-vox-party/2019/05/15/583
a6c9c-75b3-11e9-a7bf-c8a43b84ee31_story.html.
5
María Jesús Cañizares, Vox: ¿Fenómeno Mediático o Real?, CRÓNICA GLOB. (Nov. 17, 2018), https://
cronicaglobal.elespanol.com/politica/vox-fenomeno-mediatico-real_200221_102.html.
6
See Sam Jones, Spain’s Far-Right Vox Surges in Wake of Catalan Independence Protests, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/06/barcelona-picks-itself-up-after-protests-as-spain-goesto-polls; Umut Özkirimli, The Catalan Crisis Is Key to the Rise of the Spanish Far Right, GUARDIAN (Nov. 16,
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/16/catalan-crisis-spanish-far-right-vox.
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Catalans as an ethnic group and political minority have legitimate, historical
claims worthy of acknowledgement. Second, that the EU has a concrete but
compromised interest in maintaining order in an increasingly fragile situation.
Third, given the compromising predispositions of the EU, international law must
confront the challenges presented. This involves reconceptualizing or further
developing the principle of self-determination, which has been static since its
formation, but must adapt to meet the increasingly common demands of groups
like the Catalans.
I.

MYTH AND HISTORY: MAKING SENSE OF THE MODERN LEGAL MAZE OF
CATALONIAN SECESSION

Catalonia’s history is one that predates the concept of Spain by hundreds of
years and as such, it is one of rich contradiction, foundational mythmaking, and
profound emotional influence. This section will provide an outline of their
colorful past to understand the legal puzzle that the region finds itself in today.
This legal-historical sketch is included because it is part of the story, as
important an element in modern Catalan life as any bit of the contemporary
news, and key to understanding the region’s place in international legal
discourse.7 Throughout the journey, it will become clear that there are several
common motifs: that abuse, the challenge of dual nationality, the contention of
multilingualism, and above all, secession attempts, are not new to Catalonia.
It is important to distinguish what these historical facts do not mean. They
have no bearing on the legal status of Catalonia today. These stories are an
essential part of Catalans’ cultural story and lend credence to their position as a
distinct, minority political group.8 This section will highlight those episodes
critical to the formation of the Catalan pátria, elaborating only on the grievances
and the triumphs central to the legal debate currently tearing the nation at its
seams. The section ends with a snapshot of the legal situation of modern Spain,
stressing the key issues of constitutional crisis and subsequent deadlock
stemming from illegal referenda and lack of governmental relief. The problem
7
Kate Keller, Beyond the Headlines, Catalan Culture Has a Long History of Vibrancy and Staying
Power, SMITHSONIAN (June 25, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/beyond-headlinescatalan-culture-has-long-history-vibrancy-and-staying-power-180969294.
8
See Minorities Under International Law, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/
en/issues/minorities/pages/internationallaw.aspx#:~:text=According%20to%20a%20definition%20offered,do
minant%20position%2C%20whose%20members%20%2D%20 (stipulating that “[t]here is no internationally
agreed definition as to which groups constitute minorities. It is often stressed that the existence of a minority is
a question of fact and that any definition must include both objective factors [such as the existence of a shared
ethnicity, language or religion] and subjective factors [including that individuals must identify themselves as
members of a minority].”).
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that will begin to emerge is the gulf that exists between groups like the Catalans
and their ability to attain relief under the law.
A. Early History: Myth and Nation Building
The legend of the pátria of Catalonia begins in an Iberia on the threshold of
antiquity, in a city what was then called Barcino, perhaps named by the Romans
or after the infamous Carthaginian General.9 In its first millennium the occupants
of the northeastern corner of the rugged, Iberian marchland came to be known
as the Catalans, their name possibly deriving from the “Gothic” settlers who
originally emigrated to the region.10 Although their etymology remains shrouded
in mystery, it is no secret that their existence was torn between the many
powerful kingdoms to the south and the Frankish militaristic state to the north
from the beginning.11 Following a term of occupation under Charlemagne in the
ninth century and a period of brief independence, the Catalans secured a marital
union with the powerful kingdom of Aragon.12 This alliance, coupled with the
leadership of Count-King Jaume I “the Conqueror,” began Catalonia’s
mercantile domination of the Mediterranean with its powerful seafaring and
commercial empire based out of what was by now called Barcelona.13
In the late fifteenth century Ferdinand and Isabella united in marriage,
forging their respective kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, declaring themselves
King and Queen of las Españas (the Spains), and creating “a plural political
entity, a composite monarchy similar to those found elsewhere in the Europe of
their day.”14 Unfortunately, the Iberian situation would prove immensely more
complicated to consolidate, as this “composite monarchy” comprised of the
several autonomous territories under allegiance to a single ruler proved difficult
to navigate.15 By the late sixteenth century, the Catalans had grown jealous of
the immense growth of the Castilian Crown on account of its burgeoning
international empire.16

9
See WILLIAM H. ROBINSON, BARCELONA AND MODERNITY: PICASSO, GAUDI, MIRO, DALI 4 (2006);
see also A.E.J. MORRIS, HISTORY OF URBAN FORM BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 78 (3d ed. 2013).
10
JAMES ANDERSON, ROYAL GENEALOGIES, OR, THE GENEALOGICAL TABLES OF EMPERORS, KINGS, AND
PRINCES FROM ADAM TO THESE TIMES 714 (1732).
11
ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 7–8.
12
Id. at 8.
13
Id. at 9.
14
Id. at 10.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 21.
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B. The Middle Period and La Diada
This jealousy soon turned into fear as many Catalans worried that the
growing central monarchy was at odds with the region’s interests, and the rulers
were intent on suppressing and undermining the region’s cherished constitution,
laws, and freedoms.17 It was during this period, and probably in response to this
perceived threat, that the legendary, nationalistic mythmaking about Catalonia’s
past began to appear. With stories of the legendary ninth century ruler Wilfred
the Hairy’s final stand, blood dripping down his yellow shield, the emblematic
symbol of Catalan bravery and resistance in the name of liberty was born in
fantastical historical embellishments, which endure to this day in the region’s
flag.18
To make matters worse, the seventeenth century saw efforts by many state
officials to institute a “Castilianization” of the peninsula,19 led primarily by
Count Olivares who sought to strengthen the centrality of the growing state of
Spain.20 It was during this tumultuous period that Catalonia revolted and
participated in their first secessionist experiment that failed after only twelve
short years of independence.21 This revolt left permanent bitterness between
Madrid and Barcelona, the hubs of political hegemony in each region, which
also have endured to the present day.22 As Barcelona’s commercial and urban
networks began expanding as a result of its thriving textile industry, Barcelonans
and other Catalans fought hard to maintain their fueros, the laws and privileges
granted to their region which they so firmly feared the Castilian Crown wished
to erode.23
The death of Spanish King Carlos II, the last of the Habsburg line, threw
Spain and much of Europe into chaos, triggering the War of Spanish
Succession.24 After over a decade of fighting and a legendary final stand in
Barcelona in a year-long siege, the city and the region fell into the hands of the
Bourbons.25 September 11, 1714 became known as la Diada (the Disaster), and
is still seen by Catalans as the triumph of foreign despotism over liberty.26 The

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 88.
Id.
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day is one of Catalonia’s major holidays and is avidly celebrated every year in
remembrance of the freedoms that were ostensibly stolen from the region.27
This defeat for Catalonia, even more painfully, became a victory for the
nation of Spain, as the Nueva Planta28 incorporated all of the regions of Iberia
into a more centralized polity under the moniker of nacion espanola, or
“Spain.”29 This took a heavy toll on the Catalan people, who were essentially
treated as a militarily occupied territory, stripped of their political power, and
banned from using their language.30 Many saw this as the end of the Catalan
nation, the long-standing notions of liberty “enshrined in a reciprocal
relationship between the ruler and the ruled” rendered arbitrarily void under a
repressive and authoritarian central government.31 In spite, or maybe even
because of this, Catalonia in the eighteenth century began to develop its
“dynamic entrepreneurial class,” as well as a new and increased sense of
isolation, familial cohesion, and industriousness, which helped establish its
economy as the highest performing region in Spain.32 Following decades of
prosperity and the chaotic appointment of Napoleon’s brother, Joseph
Bonaparte, to the Spanish throne in the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Catalonia established a Junta Superior that represented Catalan’s first semiautonomous government in over one hundred years.33
In 1812, the Spanish Constitution was ratified by the national Cortes,34
uniting Spain into a modern nation and reinforcing the need for a “dual
patriotism” of Spanish citizens to both their home region and the collective
national community.35 The attitude of liberal reform and sovereignty permeated
Spain. However, this era also highlighted the fundamental tension between the
political duty of the artificial construction that was the Spanish State, and the
organic and ancestral connection to local affairs ingrained in the hearts of

27
Sam Jones, Catalans to Celebrate Their National Day with Independence Protests, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/10/catalans-celebrate-national-day-independenceprotests.
28
The Nueva Planta were a series of decrees designed to incorporate and centralize the many regions of
Spain into an official royal administration. TOM LEWIS & FRANCISCO SANCHEZ, CULTURE AND THE STATE IN
SPAIN: 1550-1850, at 197–198 (1999).
29
ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 89.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 98.
32
Id. at 115.
33
Id. at 135.
34
The Cortes is the term long used to refer to the parliament or governing legislative body in Spain.
WILLIAM D. PHILLIPS JR. & CARLA RAHN PHILLIPS, A CONCISE HISTORY OF SPAIN 72, 176 (2010).
35
Id. at 137.
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Catalans.36 This political project is still unfolding to this day, as the question of
how to constantly rebalance the fluctuating ties and obligations has gone yet
unanswered.37
In the time leading up to the twentieth century, Catalonia’s economic
explosion became embodied in Barcelona—a city that came to embody the
region and soon dwarfed Madrid as an epicenter of political, artistic, and cultural
power.38 With this cultural flowering came the modern articulation of the
Catalan nation.39 This Renaixenca (Renaissance) was led by an upper class
intelligentsia which, along with the help of artists like Antoni Gaudi and Lluís
Domènech i Montaner, gave Barcelona a surreal architectural makeover, and a
revived interest in Catalan art and culture.40 This prosperity also ignited
powerful nationalistic spirit in the Catalans, like Pere Muntanola who said “the
state is a political entity, artificial and voluntary; the pátria is a historical, natural
and necessary community.”41 Fully situated in the Romantic paradigm of the
nineteenth century, the Catalans increasingly identified with this poetic national
rhetoric and clung to it for more than a century on their road to legally instituting
their deeply felt autonomy.42
C. Twentieth Century: Terror and Rebuilding
As with Europe and much of the rest of the world, the twentieth century was
a tumultuous time for Catalonia and Spain. The recent economic prosperity had
aggravated class tensions throughout the country.43 In 1923, Spanish General
Primo de Rivera dissolved the national Cortes and established a military
dictatorship, a stark representation of the country’s complete disaffection with
its ineffective central government.44 The question of Spanish nationalism was
once again at the fore. Could the government rally and unify the peninsula into
an iteration that would finally successfully integrate all of its regions under a
respected and effective national government?45 Early work under the
dictatorship was successful, at least for Catalonia, as they received back their
Generalitat, a legislative body representing the self-rule of the community of
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 138.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
PRAT DE LA RIBA, LA NACIONALITAT CATALANA 83 (1906).
ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 193.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 209.
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Catalonia which had been dissolved after la Diada.46 Thus, Catalonia officially
became an autonomous region within the Spanish State. However, the militant
conservative backlash against this “cultural Catalanization” was swift and
terrible.47 General Francisco Franco, in a chauvinistic and vehement tirade,
swept through the country and, holding a particular vitriol for Catalonia,
violently shut down the region when brought under his control.48 The Franco
dictatorship was especially harsh for the Catalans and Basques.49 When brought
under the command of his Nationalist party, he brutally repatriated the region,
repressing use of the Catalan language and violently attempting to “extinguish
the Catalan identity,” which he believed to be a contravention of the nationalism
of absolute power represented in the great past monarchs.50
With grit and perseverance weathered over centuries of challenges, the
Catalans survived Franco’s regime, which attempted at nearly every turn to
smother Catalan identity.51 Following the dictator’s death and the restoration of
the monarchy under Don Juan Carlos in 1975, an attempt to bring about a
democratically unified Spain was once again within the sights of Spanish
lawmakers and was codified in the 1978 Constitution.52 The importance of the
legal language of this document is still being fought over today. Article 2, in a
very carefully crafted ambiguity, establishes the “indissoluble unity of the
Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible pátria of all Spaniards.”53 As
previously mentioned, this word pátria is very important for the regions of
Spain, Catalonia in particular. However, nowhere in the Constitution do the
drafters allow any of the regions the legal status of pátria.54 They are instead
nacionalidades, or nationalities, “a more neutral term than ‘nation,’ which was
carefully avoided except when applied to Spain itself.”55 Despite the legalistic
language games, Catalonia was once again granted a statute of autonomy in
1979. This statute recognized Catalan as an official language equal to Castilian
Spanish and granted significant governing powers to the Generalitat,
particularly in areas of education and culture.56 It seemed then to be a victory for
the region. Despite its financial and judicial powers having to comply with the
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 212.
Id. at 215–17.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 226.
C.E., B.O.E. n. 2, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 228.
Id.
Id. at 229.
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national Constitution, the new government based out of the Generalitat and
headed by regional President Jordi Pujol was an officially recognized and
integral part of a “democratic, decentralized, and modernizing Spain.”57
D. Tumultuous Modern Legal and Political Atmosphere
The last chapter in Catalan history has been a steady journey from
hopefulness to disarray. Under the leadership of the Pujol government and his
Convergencia i Unio (CiU) party, Catalonia pushed for additional regional
competences.58 Playing the game of Madrid politics strikingly well, the CiUdominated Generalitat was able to increase its original number of competences
(eighty-nine under the statute of autonomy, a number that already topped those
awarded to the Basque region, and by far the most in Spain) to a whopping 274
in just a few decades.59 As one historian put it, the “aim of Pujol and his CiU
party was to endow Catalonia with as many of the trappings of a sovereign state
as they could.”60 The zealousness of this political mission seeped into popculture as well. Writings like Victus and the non-fictional historical work of
Victor Ferro pushed arguments that Catalonia was once a great, complete state,
maligned by outside forces and destroyed by the Bourbons, and due reparations
for this historical malfeasance.61
After a long tenure that bureaucratized and complicated regional politics in
Spain, Pujol, mired in corruption scandals and increasing unpopularity, stepped
down and was replaced by Pasqual Maragall.62 In a 2005 effort to forward the
Catalan nationalist agenda, Maragall made a push to expand and reinforce
Catalan autonomy by revising the 1979 statute of autonomy. The new statute
significantly and audaciously included language declaring Catalonia a “pátria,”
a word already shown to be sensitive in Spanish legal culture.63 In its 2010
ruling, the Spanish Supreme Constitutional Tribunal made several modifications
to this statutory revision.64 It declared the sections referencing Catalonia as a
“nation” illegal and held the provisions that made Catalan the preferred language

57

Id.
Id. at 233 (i.e., regional powers).
59
Id.
60
Id at 234.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 237.
63
Organic Act 6/2006 of the 19th July, on the Reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia Preamble,
art. 1 (2006) (Catalonia).
64
S.T.C., June 28, 2010 (J.T.S., No. 31/2010) (Spain).
58
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of the region void.65 In response, the “We are a nation. We Decide” movement
took to the streets of Barcelona, calling for a referendum.66
Unfortunately for the Catalans, the referendum procedure is firmly within
the legal competence of the central government. The Constitution very clearly
requires that a declaration of independence would need to gain approval by a
majority of the Cortes and would require a general election to decide the
matter.67 However, this did little to quell the rising political activity in Barcelona
and throughout Catalonia. As during a 2012 summer of massive demonstrations,
1.5 million people took to the streets in the region’s capital under the banner of
“Catalonia: a New State of Europe.”68 Artur Mas, the new president of the
Generalitat, was now at a pivotal point of no return; faced with the difficult
political choice of distancing himself and his party from the CiU, he chose
instead to endorse wholeheartedly “Catalonia’s right to decide,” which was a
powerful and risky diplomatic move.69
Many historians posit this moment as the fruition of a thirty year process of
“Catalanization” begun by the Pujol regime, during which an entire generation
of more fervent nationalists were educated, even indoctrinated, in Catalan
history and legend.70 In education programs sponsored and run by the
Generalitat, children were taught a form of Catalan history that was separate and
routinely victimized under the Castilian State—even a geography that
deemphasized the rest of the Iberian peninsula in favor of the Western
Mediterranean.71 The language of separatism and oppression that had been
taught for several decades was now spilling out into the streets in a form of
political expression unmatched in the history of modern Catalonia. However, in
spite of these strong feelings, Catalonia, as always, was not uniform in its
convictions. Despite sloganeering like Espanya ens roba (Spain is robbing us)
and the mass demonstrations, resistance parties opposed to independence like

65

S.T.C., June 28, 2010 (J.T.S., No. 31/2010) (Spain).
Chris Bambery, We Are a Nation. We Decide: Catalonia Calling, COUNTERFIRE (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.counterfire.org/articles/opinion/18781-we-are-a-nation-we-decide-catalonia-calling.
67
WILLIAM CHISLETT, A NEW COURSE FOR SPAIN: BEYOND THE CRISIS 82 (2016).
68
See Tomàs Delclós, Cálculo de Manifestantes, PAÍS (Sept. 13, 2012), https://elpais.com/elpais/2012/
09/13/defensor_del_lector/1347549569_134754.html; Olga Khazan, Catalonia Rallies for Independence on
‘Catalan National Day’, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/
catalonia-rallies-for-independence-on-catalan-national-day/2012/09/11/ac729d80-fc24-11e1-a31e-804fccb658
f9_blog.html.
69
ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 242.
70
Id.
71
Id.
66
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the Partido Popular, the Catalan Socialist Party, and the Ciutadans performed
strongly in elections that put pressure on the Mas government.72
This polarization grew and, when the Generalitat declared an illegal
referendum in open defiance of the Constitution, only forty percent of Catalans
turned out to vote.73 This lent credence to the beliefs that outright independence
was a dream of the upper class, “while the working class, many of them with a
Castilian-speaking background, were either hostile to the idea, or were satisfied
with the degree of autonomy Catalonia already enjoyed.”74 In the backlash of
this fiercely contested and largely decried referendum,75 Mas stepped down as
president, turning the office over to former journalist, political activist, and
mayor of Girona, Carles Puigdemont, in 2016.76
Things again began to heat up between Barcelona and Madrid as charges
were brought against several politicians, including former President Mas, for
their involvement with the illegal referendums.77 Interrupting this political
drama, however, were the horrific terrorist attacks that killed fourteen people
along Barcelona’s famous main passage, Las Ramblas.78 Despite the national
outpouring of sympathy for Catalonia and a chance for harmony following the
attacks, when Spanish President Mariano Rajoy and King Don Juan Carlos
visited Barcelona in a show of solidarity and support, thousands marched and
booed their presence, blaming them for the attacks and holding them responsible
for permitting the sales of arms in Gulf states.79
Only one month following these events, the Catalan parliament passed a law
approving another referendum in open contravention of the Constitution, which
was subsequently declared illegal by the Constitutional Tribunal the following

72

Id. at 243.
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Barcelona Terror Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/world/europe/
barcelona-catalunya-van.html.
79
ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 251.
73

SKINNER_7.11.22

2022]

7/11/2022 10:50 AM

SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE CATALAN CRISIS

401

day.80 President Rajoy, who was keen on keeping his distance and allowing time
for things to simmer down, was under mounting pressure for his perceived
passivity in the face of this crisis.81 Catalonia began to economically suffer as
numerous banks and companies began relocating from Barcelona to Madrid
(3000 in all), taking with them a great chunk of the Catalan economy and
offering little hope that the future held a solution.82
At this point, the longtime failure of the Spanish State to build a strong and
inclusive national narrative and handle Catalan cries for independence had born
a constitutional crisis.83 Despite the regional division, there was a mass of
insatiable cries for more autonomy and democratic representation through
referendum, despite the legal consequences.
Thus, on October 1, 2017, another referendum was held and quickly erupted
into chaos. Despite Spanish orders to prevent the vote from taking place, the
Mossos D’Esquadra (Catalan police force) was largely unwilling to enforce
these orders. This led the national police to descend onto polling stations and
quickly resort to force and heavy-handed violence to prevent Catalans from
casting their votes.84 Quite predictably, with few dissenters to participate in an
illegal referendum,85 ninety-two percent of voters responded that they would like
Catalan to form an independent state.86 However, the damage was done as the
result of the vote, combined with an onslaught of one-sided images of national
police striking innocent voters with batons and firing rubber bullets, quickly
turned the international mood towards the Catalans.87
Puigdemont’s wavering leadership only added to the confusion, and the
Spanish parliament demanded he announce whether the declaration of
independence was legitimate. If so, the Spanish parliament would trigger Article
80
Catalan Parliament Paves Way for Independence Vote, VOA NEWS (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.
voanews.com/europe/catalan-parliament-paves-way-independence-vote.
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Id. at 253.
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Spain: Police Used Excessive Force in Catalonia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.
hrw.org/news/2017/10/12/spain-police-used-excessive-force-catalonia.
85
Only two million Catalans voted (around forty-three percent of the regional population). El Govern
Anuncia un 90% de “Síes” Entre las 2.262.424 Papeletas Contadas y Asegura Haber Escrutado el 100,88% de
Votos, MUNDO (Oct. 2, 2017) [hereinafter El Govern Anuncia], https://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2017/10/02/
59d1725fca4741da328b458d.html; El Govern Trasllada els Resultats Definitius del Referčndum de l’1
d’Octubre al Parlament de Catalunya, GOVERN (Oct. 6, 2017) [hereinafter El Govern Trasllada], https://web.
archive.org/web/20171006212613/http://www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/monografics/303541/governtrasllada-resultats-definitius-referendum-l1-doctubre-parlament-catalunya.html.
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155 of the Constitution, suspending the Catalan regional government for being
in breach of the law.88 Trapped between mounting pressures from abroad and
his internal supporters,89 Puigdemont scrambled for any sort of play, delaying
and ultimately backing down from signing the decree.90 However, the following
day, the Catalonian parliament unilaterally declared an independent Catalonia in
a secret ballot.91
Predictably, Rajoy’s government invoked Article 155 and imposed direct
rule over the region, releasing arrest warrants on a whole host of politicians
including Puigdemont on charges of sedition, rebellion, and embezzlement of
public funds.92 In response, Puigdemont and several of his colleagues fled to
Brussels seeking asylum.93 In a string of surprising acts, Rajoy’s government
and the judiciary released six of the arrested ministers on bail who said they
would recant the declaration of independence as merely symbolic. The Spanish
government also withdrew the arrest warrant on Puigdemont, allowing him to
live without fear of extradition in Belgium, and called for new elections.94 This
lenience was a risky move, and turned out to be very costly. By again
underestimating the power and popularity of Catalan secessionism, the Spanish
government was faced with a new election.95 A seventy-nine percent turnout rate
yielded a forty-seven percent vote in favor of secessionism (concentrated in the
more rural areas of Catalonia) and gave secessionists a seventy-seat
parliamentary majority.96
The many months of buildup to the present have been filled with more unrest
and political uncertainty. At the end of 2019, the national government’s already
weak tolerance worn thin. The Supreme Court issued sentences of the Catalan
ministers on trial, finding all twelve guilty and sending nine to prison.97 The
88
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response to this was a mix of peaceful and violent protest calling for the freedom
of the jailed ministers, the worst of the violence resulting in the closing of the
Barcelona airport and the city’s cherished Sagrada Familia cathedral.98 In late
September of 2020, the Supreme Court issued another controversial ruling
banning Puigdemont’s successor Quim Torra from holding office for his
allowance of pro-independence symbols to remain on public buildings despite
orders to remove them.99 This leaves the present situation in as much political
turmoil and uncertainty as any moment in Catalonia’s millennia-spanning
history. Further, this situation is far from vanishing. As of the local elections of
February 15, 2021, the separatists increased their overall majority.100 However,
this is not an unfamiliar situation for the Catalans. Internal solutions have never
proven successful, and the region is long overdue for pursuing, or at least
considering other legal mechanisms to remedy the Catalans’ enduring struggle.
II. WHERE IS THE EU?
If centralized oppression was the source of Catalonia’s domestic woes, then
the source of their struggle and frustration with the European Union is one borne
of bureaucratic indifference. Following such a rapid, internal decay, most
European Union Member States would turn toward Brussels for a guiding hand
in achieving peace and stability. After all, these are core values guiding the
existence of the EU.101 The Catalans, however, have heard nothing but silence
or condemnation from the Union. Frequently keeping the issue beyond arm’s
reach with the justification that it is an “internal matter,”102 it is worth examining
why the EU seems intent on pursuing this strategy of non-intervention.
The following section argues that there is a clash between the aspirational
value of the laws in place and their actual, realistic outcomes. First, there is the
legal architecture of EU Treaties themselves. These, while seemingly providing
hope for some level of political self-determination, offer nothing but an illusory
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Stephen Burgen, Violence Erupts after Pro-Catalan General Strike in Barcelona, GUARDIAN (Oct. 18,
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/18/catalonia-general-strike-protests-independence.
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POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.politico.eu/article/socialists-win-most-votes-in-catalonia-but-separatists-set-tomaintain-power.
101
Consolidated Version Treaty of the Treaty on European Union Preamble, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C
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promise. Although the law begs to be read as a safe harbor for politically
frustrated groups, the substance of its promises is largely rhetorical. This leads
to the second key point, namely that the vision of a self-determined political
destiny for sub-state groups has largely had to be discounted in favor of more
practical considerations.
Perhaps the reason for this is in part tied to the increasingly popular use of
referenda as a political tool in Europe.103 Some posit that the EU is losing the
battle against this widespread crusade that “give[s] an impression of
democracy,” but which may be nothing more than a “way for populist
movements to force democratically elected governments’ hands.”104 Faced with
the daunting challenge to “defend common standards on the core obligations that
allow members to trust each other,”105 the EU’s rational interest lies in choosing
stability over quixotic independence campaigns. Thus, as will be demonstrated
below, the Catalans are faced with another structural barrier to representation.
A. The Law on Its Face
Problems that arise within Member States of the EU are governed by the
“Treaties” (The Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union), the interpretations of which extend to include their
general purpose and spirit if there is no explicit solution within the text of the
documents themselves.106 For EU Member States, it is only after exhausting
these legal remedies that public international law and its doctrines concerning
secession may be contemplated.107
First, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
establishes that “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be
a citizen of the Union [and] . . . shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties

103
See generally Eve Hepburn, What Next for Independence Movements in Europe?, CTR. ON CONST.
CHANGE (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/opinions/what-next-independencemovements-europe.
104
Susi Dennison, Where’s the E.U. in the Catalonia Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/catalonia-eu.html (alteration in original).
105
Heather Grabbe & Stehan Lehne, Defending EU Values in Poland and Hungary, CARNEGIE EUR. (Sept.
4, 2017), https://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/09/04/defending-eu-values-in-poland-and-hungary-pub-72988.
106
The EU as a Community of Law: Overview of the Role of Law in the Union, at 6, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY
RSCH. SERV. (Mar. 2017) (“When interpreting EU law, the CJEU pays particular attention to the aim and purpose
of EU law [teleological interpretation], rather than focusing exclusively on the wording of the provisions
[linguistic interpretation].”).
107
David Edward, EU Law and the Separation of Member States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L. REV. 1151, 1162
(2013).
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provided for in the Treaties.”108 The Treaty of the European Union (TEU)
contemplates among its general goals the concepts of democracy, “rights of
persons belonging to minorities[;]”109 a general “respect [for] the equality of
Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent
in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional[;]” the “principle of
sincere cooperation[;]” and a requirement that the “Member States shall
facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure
which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives.”110 Both of
these documents read on their face to favor the Catalans: through Catalans’
vested right to EU citizenship status and the enumerated commitment to the
principles of freedom and democracy, they appear entitled to an institutional
remedy.
A twin aspect key to the functioning of the EU, however, is Member State
sovereignty. In another portion of the TEU, it is made explicitly clear that
Member States, “their national identities, inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local selfgovernment” are to be respected.111 In particular, the section continues to make
explicitly clear that the EU shall respect “essential State functions, including
ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and
safeguarding national security,” and that “national security remains the sole
responsibility of each Member State.”112 The Catalan crisis easily falls within
the purview of these sections, relegating the issue to the domestic sphere and
entitling the EU to sufficient technical reason for abstinence. Not only does this
remove the crisis from the ambit of the EU, it has deeper implications for the
Catalans. Their rights to recognition under EU law are attached to their
membership of the Spanish State, disentitling the Catalans to any independent
recognition apart from the Member State within which they reside.
Furthermore, in the background of all of these rights and procedural
mechanisms are the influential legal theories of former President of the
European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, who pronounced in his famous
theory (now regarded as the Barroso Theory) as follows:
[T]he EU is founded on the Treaties which apply only to the Member
States who have agreed and ratified them. If part of the territory of a
108
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 20(1)–(2), Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 01 [hereinafter TFEU].
109
TEU, supra note 101, art. 17.
110
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111
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112
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Member State would cease to be part of that state because it were to
become a new independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply
to that territory.113

Lurking underneath this theory is a policy position advanced by many, most
prominently Professor Joseph Weiler, that:
Europe should not seem like a Nirvana for that form of irredentist
Euro-tribalism which contradicts the deep values and needs of the
Union. The assumption of automatic membership in the Union should
be decisively squelched by the countries from whom secession is
threatened and if their leaders, for internal political reasons, lack the
courage so to say, by other Member States of the Union.114

Addressing the Catalan situation in particular, Weiler called it “ethically
demoralizing” and merely an attempt to put to political use the injustices of the
Franco era which are “but a fig leaf for seriously misdirected social and
economic egoism, cultural and national hubris and the naked ambition of local
politicians.”115
It is unclear the extent to which these political-philosophical undercurrents
still exist within the current administration in Brussels. However, in response to
the referendum, the European Commission did all but declare the act illegal,
designating it as an internal matter for the Spanish to resolve amongst
themselves.116 This was in addition to a more colorful statement made by the
European Parliament Vice President Ramon Luis Valcarcel, who condemned the
referendum as:
[A] nationalistic propaganda act, undemocratic; a coup attempt against
Spanish democracy, and so a coup against Europe. . . . We are
witnessing the first coup against democracy in the history of the
European Union. A regional government is angling, in a unilateral,
illegal and democratically deplorable manner, to secede from a
member state. And in so doing, it is violating the fundamental rights
of millions of citizens. . . . Spain is an integral part of the EU, ‘which
respects and safeguards the national identities and constitutional

113

Answer Given by Mr. Barroso on Behalf of the Commission, 2014 O.J. (C 208) 1, 217.
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structure of its member states. ‘An attack on the constitution of one
member state is therefore also an attack on the Union as a whole.’117

Putting aside that this was uttered by an anti-secessionist People’s Party member
from Spain, the statement still serves as evidence that the EU frowns upon and
wants nothing to do with the cries coming from Catalonia.118
Bearing this in mind it seems as though, under EU law, were Catalonia to
secede from Spain, it would find itself automatically untethered from its rights
as an EU member.119 Under EU law, it would exist in “some form of legal
limbo,” with no legal obligations owed from the EU.120 Catalans would be
utterly alone, in a legalistic oblivion unentitled to relief from any Member State
or EU body, in hope only for some Good Samaritan to save them from this costly
unmooring.121 This, as many have pointed out, severely weakens the possibility
of arbitrating a solution as the EU retains a weak hand at the bargaining table.122
Were the EU to try and mediate a solution, it would be unable to offer anything
other than automatic expulsion and the normal process of application for EU
membership.123
One is left wondering about the costs of this governmental apathy. Surely
the Treaty writers and the general spirit of the EU could not have intended for
the complex web of legal relationships, liabilities, and obligations spun by
Treaty law to come unraveling in an instant with no recourse or option for
resolution.124 Surely also, as the general model of the Barroso Theory holds, the
EU wishes to avoid an ever-present threat of Balkanization—scenarios in which
the vast number of sub-national minorities across Europe follow the efforts of
Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders and lead to an undoing of the project based on
interconnectedness and interdependence. The trouble is balancing a firm
commitment to international stability with no recursive remedy for all of these
groups. It runs the risk of alienation and disillusionment, begging important
questions for the future of European cooperation.
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B. When Law Collides with Aspiration
Despite the initial gloomy outlook, many Catalans for a long time considered
the EU to be an ally for their cause, as evidenced by their participation rate in
elections to the European Parliament (the only directly elected European body)
being thirteen points higher than the European average.125 Attitudes began
shifting however in response to the EU’s lack of action amidst the Puigdemont
exile, with demonstrations to the tune of nearly 50,000 Catalan and Flemish
separatists marching through Brussels, decrying the refusal of the EU to uphold
their respective rights to self-determination and democracy.126 One possibility
for redress comes in the form of Article 7 of the TEU which allows the EU to
sanction a Member State in the form of revoking voting rights in cases of “clear
risk of a serious breach” to the “values referred to in Article 2.”127 However,
hopes for the triggering of this mechanism are low considering one needs
support of eighty percent of Member States and the consent of the European
Parliament to even determine whether Spain may be at risk of breaching EU
values.128
It is quite clear that Catalonia wants to remain in the EU. There has never
been a poll to date that shows otherwise,129 and even Puigdemont has spoken of
wanting to avoid a “‘traumatic’ split” with Spain, seemingly driven by a desire
to avoid the harmful EU ramifications.130 Besides the problems laid out under
the Treaties and the Barroso theory, it has become increasingly clear that the EU
outlook on separatism and self-determination is not as optimistic as it seems.
The EU, at its core, is designed to be a supranational project, aimed at
developing into something of a post-national model.131 This post-nationalistic
political experiment is “a co-determination process based on pooled
sovereignties.”132 This means that EU Member States have renounced to a

125
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degree their sovereignty to join this collective, with the long-term objective
focused on achieving an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”133
All European peoples, or those who have won “the historical opportunity to
constitute themselves as a national-state” co-determine their common future as
a new original polity.134 This is the key source of frustration for Catalonia. It is
a region which touts itself as a historically separate nation, but it is never fully
able to achieve recognition by the Spanish national government and now seems
forever doomed under the present system of EU law. If this is correct, then
“[l]ooking to EU law for a right to self-determination in the classical sense for
peoples who do not yet have their own national state is historical nonsense.”135
To put this another way, what the Catalans are calling for is “the possibility
of fully participating in this co-determination of our common European
future.”136 In this respect, achieving independence is indeed a nonsensical and
inessential step towards inter-European cooperation.137 However, it is not clear
that this is what Catalonia wants from the EU. It may very well be that the
Catalan feeling of companionship with the EU is one based on political
opportunism and an intent to seize upon guarantees of self-determination and
democracy in light of hundreds of years of stalemate within Spain. This
paradoxical uncertainty and legal indecision actually represent a fundamental
doubt about where the EU currently is and where it intends to go in the future.
The erosion of national boundaries and de-emphasis of individual nation-state
interests have certainly worked to an extent. However, it is not clear that these
have lived up to the aspirations of the original Treaties given the popularity of
these referenda by minority groups in Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland, not to
mention the unilateral self-interest audaciously apparent in an action like Brexit.
These are all indicia of stasis, of the EU failing to grapple with problems that
hint at fragilities of its very foundations. It is no wonder why the administration
in Belgium sits quietly, anxiously attempting to maintain the status quo.
C. Has the EU Well Run Dry?
What, then, does the EU provide for Catalonia? One scholar contends that
the best it can offer is that all parties, including the Member State in the process
of separation, meaning Spain, “negotiate in good faith in accordance with
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principles of sincere cooperation, full mutual respect and solidarity.”138 A fairly
objective read on the situation would not allow this option either. Although
Spain was relatively passive at first in response to illegal and wild actions by
Catalonia, Spanish lawmakers consistently either dismissed as unimportant or
non-serious the possibility that this situation had any concrete reality to it. Spain
refused to negotiate until drastic measures had already been taken and invited
criticism from all—with one side accusing the government of appeasing the
lawless rebels and another side accusing the government of not taking this
seriously earlier to avoid the violence and the chaos.
Again, it seems that precedent falls against the Catalans. Whereas the
national situation has proven to churn out seemingly endless scenarios of
deadlock, the very unprecedented nature of this situation for the EU leads to a
similar outcome of silence and inaction. The EU does not want to broker a deal
as it is hemmed in by both the language of the Treaties and more practical fears
that it has very little to offer Catalonia. A break from Spain in this context means
a break from the EU; which means the reestablishment of barriers and likely an
increase in hostility, no free movement for Catalan citizens or goods and
services, fragility in relation to the Euro, and no more financial support.139
Perhaps in the face of this deadlock, and without any hope on the horizon for a
potential internal or EU-led solution, the parties will seek a solution grounded
in international law.
The road for the Catalans seems to point only to international law. Without
recourse, they have trudged along chasing a phantom of democracy, only to find
a system that lacks the capacity to entertain a seemingly eternal political dispute.
At best, it seems like the EU offers an open gesture to take Catalonian qualms
elsewhere. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has held self-determination to
be “a principle of international law applicable to all non-self-governing
territories and to all peoples who have not yet achieved independence.”140 The
ECJ even went as far in 2016 to write that this generally applicable principle of
international law is guaranteed to “all non-self-governing territories and to all
peoples who have not yet achieved independence.”141 These decisions
seemingly acquiesce to self-determination referenda held within the EU, like the
ones in Saarland, Greenland, and Scotland.142 However, these referenda were all
held under the domestic law from the states where they emerged. It is highly
138
139
140
141
142
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doubtful (given the response to the Catalan attempts) that such a tolerance would
be extended to an attempt at self-determination lacking consent of the mother
state.143
In summation, the law as it stands holds that “European States that decide to
join the EU renounce their right to self-determination.”144 Each European nation,
lacking the formal competences of Statehood, must “through the perilous
collective exercise of individual human rights” assert its claim to selfdetermination, even before the recognition of the legitimacy of its national claim
has been realized.145 Some have wondered if a treaty revision may be wiser than
this system, envisioning a “specific procedure, within EU law, to deal with the
legitimate claim of European peoples within the EU that do not yet have their
own European State.”146 The present just leaves Catalonia in a confusing
situation, born of legal paradox inherent to the structure of the EU project.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Exhausted of national and continental fora, the Catalans must be able to seek
redress of their grievances under international law. The biggest challenge at this
level of law is, finally, not whether the system has the capability to objectively
resolve a dispute. Instead, the issue rests on whether international law can
produce effective remedies for novel problems. The problem lies in whether the
tools offered have enough sophistication, delicacy, and precision to resolve
complex international disputes. This section will contribute to an evolving
understanding of what is possible for the tools of international dispute resolution.
The following section will argue that the Catalan situation does not satisfy
the threshold to entitle its people to secession or external self-determination
under international law. This should not mean that they are not entitled to any
remedy, or that international law does not provide one. Building off of
arguments from several international legal scholars, this section will argue that
the modern state of the world requires a reformed vision of the device of internal
self-determination and that this fresh perspective can solve many burgeoning
political and legal problems effectively.

143
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
Id. at 15; TEU, supra note 101, art. 49.
Levrat, supra note 131, at 14.

SKINNER_7.11.22

412

7/11/2022 10:50 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

A. Self-Determination and Secession in International Law
A 19th-century concept wrought from the budding nationalism of the era,
self-determination has become a modern jus cogens norm of international law,147
tying strictly to the bedrock principle of sovereignty.148 Its first heavily
popularized iteration came from Woodrow Wilson amidst his campaign for his
Fourteen Points in 1918. Closely linking it to the grounding principle of state
sovereignty, President Wilson stated that the concept of self-determination is
“not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of actions which statesmen will
henceforth ignore at their peril.”149 Only gaining popularity throughout two
world wars, it was later codified as an international right and one of the primary
functions of the United Nations (UN). In Chapter I of the UN Charter, the second
purpose of the UN is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”150 As written,
the UN Charter attempts to restrict the potential volatility of the right to selfdetermination by doubly reaffirming that the goal of such a concept is for
peacemaking and international community building.
The right is expanded under Article I of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as follows: “[a]ll peoples have the right
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”151 The
potential explosivity linked to this concept is clearly visible in the last few
decades, as numerous independence movements across the world have relied
upon this language to bolster their claims for separatism. Unfortunately, these
movements are often entangled with local culture and politics, meaning that this
treaty language is often an unrefined, blunt instrument that offers more questions
than answers. Although a highly contentious and expansive topic, this section
will focus on three issues that most directly apply to the Catalan situation: 1) the
147
See Ardit Memeti & Bekim Nuhija, The Concept of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, 14
NEW BALKAN POL. 31 (2013) (explaining that jus cogens are fundamental norms that apply erga omnes “in
relation to everyone”).
148
Christian Tomuschat, Secession and Self-Determination, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW
PERSPECTIVES 1, 40 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006).
149
President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances
(Feb. 11, 1912) (transcript available at: www.gwpda.org/1918/wilpeace.html).
150
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
151
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, ¶ 999, U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, ¶ 993, U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force 1976).
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definition of “peoples”; 2) external self-determination and the closely related
concept of secession; and 3) internal self-determination.
1. Peoples
International law has struggled to define the breadth of the term “peoples”
in the language mentioned above. For the first half of the 20th century, a “people”
was squarely limited to denoting the population compromising a state or colonial
entity.152 However, following the end of the Soviet Union and the breakup of
Yugoslavia, this definition was expanded to encapsulate a wider category of
individuals, including those comprising a federal unit or region of a larger
state.153 The difficulty lies in balancing between being overly general and
discriminatorily narrow. For example, as a jus cogens norm applied erga omnes,
“peoples” could not be used to refer to any special category without quickly
veering into discriminatory character based on race, ethnicity, culture, religious
or other grounds.154 This must be navigated, however, since the meaning of this
term “determines who are the holders of the rights of self-determination and has
a primary effect on the establishment of the harmony between the principle of
self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity.”155
In an effort to refine this nebulousness, a report organized by the UNESCO
Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace defined “all peoples” to
include “peoples under colonial or alien subjugation or domination, those under
occupation, indigenous peoples and other communities who satisfy the criteria
generally accepted for determining the existence of a people.”156 In addition, in
an UNESCO International Meeting of the Experts for the Elucidation of the
Concepts of Rights of Peoples, a “people” was defined as “a group of individual
human beings who enjoy some or all of the following common features: a) a
common historical tradition; b) racial or ethnic identity; c) cultural homogeneity;
d) linguistic unity; e) religious or ideological affinity; f) territorial connection;
g) common economic life.”157 Although meant to be inclusive, the scope of this
definition is still inconclusive on the status of national minorities, as the
“greatest fear of the states while adopting the Covenants was that the provision
152
Aleksandar Pavković & Peter Radan, In Pursuit of Sovereignty and Self-Determination: Peoples, States
and Secession in the International Order, 3 MACQUARIE L.J. 1 (2003).
153
Id.
154
Vita Gudeleviciute, Does the Principle of Self-Determination Prevail Over the Principle of Territorial
Integrity?, 2 INT’L J. BALTIC L. 48, 52 (2005).
155
Id.
156
The Implementation of the Right to Self-Determination as a Contribution to Conflict Prevention,
UNREPRESENTED NATIONS & PEOPLES ORG. (Mar. 2, 2004), https://www.unpo.org/article/446.
157
Id.
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might be interpreted as conferring the right to self-determination on national
minorities.”158 Various groups and the difficult distinction between peoples and
minorities make hard and fast rules nearly impossible to draw. For example, do
the Palestinians, Tibetans, Basque, Kashmiris, and Catalans all fall under the
same political status? The answer to this question is enduringly unclear.159
In most international law practice, human groups are divided into three
categories: peoples, minorities, and indigenous populations, with the right of
self-determination, as we have already mentioned, only belonging to the first of
those.160 However, in general practice, many scholars agree that the term
“‘peoples’ acknowledges the existence of only one people where there exists a
State.”161 A recognized exception is one in which a “State defines itself as
constituted by a plurality of peoples having the right to self-determination and
hence to separate.”162 So, while there does not exist any comprehensive
definition either by treaty or by custom in international law of the term
“peoples,” practice has tended to illustrate that the subjective factors listed above
are most determinative.163 This, however, is bound by the important and
restrictive commitment to the maintenance of territorial integrity, a balance
which the law continues to try to adapt around.164
The boundaries of the modern right of self-determination under international
law have been in flux since their foundation. Although originally imagined as a
device to remedy and rebuild from colonization, the right as written applies to
“all peoples,” which has been something of a sticking point in modern
commentary on the issue.165 As has been pointed out many times, an expansive
interpretation of this term is not judicially operable and would potentially lead
to a worldwide Balkanization that is unsustainable and contrary to the goals of
modern internationalism.166 Thus, under international law, the Catalan question
is twofold. First, where does international law draw the line that constitutes
158

Gudeleviciute, supra note 154, at 53.
Milena Sterio, Secession: A Proposal for a New Legal Framework, GER. Y.B. INT’L L., (forthcoming
.2016) (manuscript at 9) (available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2857209).
160
Id.
161
Marcelo G. Kohen, Introduction, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 9 (Marcelo G.
Kohen ed., 2006).
162
Id.
163
Milena Sterio, Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law: The Cases of Kurdistan
and Catalonia, 22 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Jan. 2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/1/self-determinationand-secession-under-international-law-cases-kurdistan.
164
Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373,
373–79 (2003).
165
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration].
166
Christian Tomuschat, supra note 148, at 24.
159

SKINNER_7.11.22

2022]

7/11/2022 10:50 AM

SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE CATALAN CRISIS

415

whether an ethnic group is a “people” under the meaning of the law? Second, do
the Catalans fall within this boundary? Once these answers are established,
Catalonia must brace for the complementing reality of their legal status.
The starting point in this analysis is to classify whether the Catalans fit the
criteria of a “people.” The importance of the pátria to the region cannot be
understated. As early as the 17th century, an idealistic conception of a “national
constitutionalism” had emerged at nearly every level of society.167 Even
centuries ago, and perhaps even before then, nearly all of the modern criteria for
“people” status had emerged in Catalonia. Historian J.H. Elliott claims that not
only was there a natural and organic level of kinship, unity, and allegiance that
tied this region together, but “there was also a sense of the corporation or
community as a legal and historical entity, which had acquired certain distinctive
characteristics with the passage of time, together with certain specific
obligations, rights, and privileges.”168 While the discourse on such matters is in
flux at the moment, the Catalans are included in Minority Groups International
in conjunction with the UN Refugee Agency’s reference guide as one of the
minorities and indigenous peoples of Spain.169 Despite this inclusion and the fact
that the Catalans possibly fall within the definition of a “people,” most agree
that the legal status of the Catalans does not entitle them to a right of selfdetermination in the same way a post-colonial group would be entitled.170
Perhaps, were this measure to resemble a continuum rather than a mere all-ornothing determination, the Catalans would fall near the middle, not quite
reaching the zone of oppression or colonial status to entitle it to the highest level
of “people” status, but also not without any claim to relief. As of now,
international law affords them no right to positive relief.

2. External Self-Determination and Secession
Self-determination breaks down into two major sub-categories: internal and
external.171 External self-determination is more focused on international status,
reflecting that general right of a people to “constitute itself a nation-state or to
integrate into, or federate with, an existing state” thereby earning recognition by

167

J.H. ELLIOTT, IMPERIAL SPAIN: 1469–1716, at 105 (1963).
Id.
169
World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Spain: Catalans, REFWORLD (July 2018),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749caac.html.
170
See Sterio, supra note 163; Sabrina Ragone, The Catlan Referendum on Independence: A
Constitutional Conundrum, 21 AM. SOC’Y INT’T L. (Dec. 2017), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/
16/catalan-referendum-independence-constitutional-conundrum.
171
Id.
168
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other nations .172 The right of external self-determination has typically been
reserved for groups separating from a predecessor state following colonization
or intense oppression.173 The possibility for external self-determination outside
of the context of colonization remains unclear.174 The focus of internal selfdetermination follows the existence of statehood and entitles a people to freedom
from governmental pressure preventing a people from selecting its own political,
economic, and social system.175 Simply put, the “main difference between
[internal and external self-determination] is that internal self-determination as
participatory democracy is implemented inside the boundaries of the existing
state; therefore it does not affect the territorial integrity of the state.”176
External self-determination is the stronger and more controversial option for
bolstering political rights considering it typically involves the rupture of
territorial integrity, upsets the primary goal of international stability, and
normally entails the formation of a new independent state.177 The strength of this
action is difficult to square with other customary international norms, such as
territorial integrity and uti posseditis.178 This difficulty is only furthered by the
lack of mention in any major treaties and lack of general understanding of how
to decide what is applicable or how it applies.179 However, one thing is clear:
external self-determination entails separation from the mother state and
subsequently begins the process of secession.
Decidedly lacking support in nearly any treaty, the right to secession under
international law is found in two principal documents from the General
Assembly: The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations (“Friendly Relations Declaration”) and the
Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations
(“Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration”).180 Principle five of the Friendly Relations
Declaration holds that:
172

Salvatore Senese, External and Internal Self-Determination, 16 SOC. JUST. 1, 19 (1989).
Sterio, supra note 163.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Gudeleviciute, supra note 154, at 49.
177
Id.
178
Sterio, supra note 159, at 12. Uti possidetis means “a principle in international law that recognizes
a peace treaty between parties as vesting each with the territory and property under its control unless
otherwise stipulated.” Uti possidetis, Merriam-Webster (2021), https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/
uti%20possidetis.
179
Id.
180
Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession in International Law and Declaratory General
Assembly Resolutions: Textual Content and Legal Effects, 3 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 346, 347 (2020).
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By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples
have the rights freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.181

There are alternative theories that argue for the validity of secession outside
of the colonial context. Some scholars have argued for the possibility of “just
cause secession,” or the notion that secession is inherently valid for the cause of
abuses, discrimination, or lack of respect for its rights by the mother state.182 A
renowned theory by Antonio Cassese posits that a non-colonial people may find
refuge in the Friendly Relations Doctrine “[w]hen the central authorities of a
sovereign state persistently refuse to grant participatory rights to a religious or
racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon their fundamental rights,
and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework
of the State structure.”183 However, the examination of two prominent cases
which have tackled these questions reveal a reality that refuses to allow for neat
resolve within a theory.
Highlighting the difficulties of living in a bilingual and non-monocultural,
even if affluent, society, the Quebecois population in the 20th century demanded
greater rights within Canada.184 Due to the Quebec referendum vote very
narrowly deciding to remain in Canada, the case was brought before the
Canadian Supreme Court, which importantly distinguished between internal and
external self-determination. The Court held that the latter is only appropriate in
“the most extreme cases” when a people’s right to self-determination is being
“totally frustrated” internally.185 Thus, in keeping with the theme of earlier
international law espoused in the likes of the Aaland Islands Commission,186 the
Canadian Supreme Court “reaffirmed the supremacy of territoriality and the
territorial integrity of existing states over any notions of self-determination; the
latter may disrupt territoriality only in the most extreme circumstances, where a
people is oppressed by the mother state.”187
181

Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 165.
Sterio, supra note 159, at 15.
183
Id. (quoting Antonio Cassese, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 19 (1995)).
184
Id. at 12.
185
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 126, 135.
186
The Aaland Islands dispute was one of the first disputes regulated by the Council of the League of
Nations and ultimately failed to recognize a general right of self-determination. Oliver Diggelmann, The Aaland
Case and the Sociological Approach to International Law, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 135, 137 (2007).
187
Joshua Castellino & Jérémie Gilbert, International Law and Self-Determination: Peoples, Indigenous
Peoples, and Minorities, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32, 44 (Christian
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Kosovo is another matter entirely. Following centuries of occupation by the
Ottomans, the Kingdom of Serbia, and Yugoslavia, the Kosovar sought
independence in 1991 with the declarations of the surrounding nations of
Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia.188 After a decade of unrest, fierce domination
under Slobodan Milosovic, and a NATO bombing campaign seeking to end the
harsh treatment against the Kosovar, Resolution 1244 of the UN Security
Council was passed which laid out the framework for forming an international
administration for Kosovo.189 However, after years of unrest and instability,
Kosovo’s legal status remained unclear and, following a declaration of
independence in 2008, the case for Kosovar independence was brought by Serbia
before the International Court of Justice.190 In a ten to four vote, the Court held
that the declaration of independence did not violate international law and, while
refusing to specify whether a general right to secession existed, the Court
tolerated this secession. The Court justified this secession on the grounds that it
was achieved by non-state actors and did not violate the principle of territorial
integrity.191
Kosovo is a very difficult case to reconcile, considering it was a de facto
secession which was recognized as legitimate by roughly half of the world’s
countries with seemingly no consensus on why it is valid.192 For this reason,
scholars like Stefan Oeter tend to categorize the Kosovo case as one of the “hard
cases that make bad law.”193 According to Oeter and Milena Sterio, Kosovo may
be considered bad precedent for other separatist movements because of its
uniqueness (although, which of the non-colonial cases does not have its own
complex history and unique issues?) and the ongoing interference from the
international community.194 Detractors point to the fact that the Kosovar were
no longer facing oppression at the time independence was declared, the justcause theory no longer satisfied in the light of the new political leadership and
treatment by Serbia. So perhaps the ICJ let the history and messiness of the
situation work too far into its ruling. Many legal scholars have made it very clear
that the outcome of their decision has been less than sturdy and stable but
nevertheless, it stands as an example of non-colonial secessionist precedent.195
Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg & Kavus Abushov eds., 2014).
188
Sterio, supra note 159, at 18.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 18–19.
191
Id. at 19.
192
Id.
193
Stefan Oeter, Recognition and Non-Recognition with Regard to Secession, in SELF-DETERMINATION
AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 187, at 59.
194
Id. at 30; Sterio, supra note 159, at 17.
195
Sterio, supra note 159, at 17.
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In summation, although the normative basis of external self-determination
leading to secession remains debated, given the volatility of this legal
mechanism, the present preference of international law seems to only want to,
“recognise [sic] a right to UNC [unilateral non-colonial] secession in response
to the most egregious human rights violations.”196
Many have argued for the complete separation of Catalonia from Spain, with
one legal scholar musing that when, “discussions within the constitutional order
cannot produce results, or if it appears to one side that that order is bound to
place it in a position of inequality and disadvantage, it is not surprising that
pressure to simply step out of that framework through a declaration of
independence increases.”197 Others have more convincingly suggested that the
secessionist argument is, “very difficult to craft for Catalonia.”198 The region
clearly has a high degree of autonomy, has not been victimized to the threshold
of oppression to satisfy the blessing of international law for secession, and
evidence suggests that the central government is willing to negotiate and respect
the autonomous position in the future.199 In summary, it seems that Catalonia
does not reach the status typically awarded the right to a complete break from
Spain. Although a worthy debate is to be had about the ethics of this standard,
there are other considerations that must be made about why Catalonia should not
try for complete separation.
Aside from this lack of proper legal positioning, it seems to be against the
international order-building norms of international law to destabilize a region so
drastically. Several arguments support this claim. First, there is no historical
evidence that newly independent countries economically perform better
following their breaks from their mother state.200 At best they tend to maintain
their previous growth patterns.201 Second, there is little to no evidence that
Catalonian institutions perform better than the rest of Spain.202 In fact, pervasive
corruption and mismanagement places Catalonia last among the Spanish regions
and in the bottom third (130 out of 190) EU regions in a study measuring quality
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Anderson, supra note 180, at 395.
Marc Weller, Secession and Self-Determination in Western Europe: The Case of Catalonia, BLOG EUR.
J. INT’L L. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/secession-and-self-determination-in-western-europe-the-case-ofcatalonia.
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Sterio, supra note 163.
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Angel Ubide, A Balanced View of the Economics of Independence in Catalonia, PETERSON INST. INT’L
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of government.203 All of this evidence suggests that the prudent solution is to
turn away from a destabilizing secession. However, independence movements
are rarely prudent. In fact, they are emotionally charged, comprised of
grievances that are as essential to a group’s cultural makeup as its very language.
It is for this reason that international law provides a better-fitting solution than
merely the external/internal dichotomy. The normative strains of selfdetermination described above can lend helpful solutions to the Catalans.
3. Internal Self-Determination and Beyond
Internal self-determination is preferable in many situations and is often able
to be exercised meaningfully due to, “its less intrusive nature and its respect for
the principle of territorial integrity of existing states.”204 Internal selfdetermination broadly has to do with the exercise of domestic power. This is
done in several ways depending upon the nation. For example, some iterations
have concluded with merely the freedom from foreign intervention205 while
Portugal’s iteration of the concept extends to, “the consent of the people to a
certain structure and political organization.”206
Recent developments in the law have suggested that, “granting internal selfdetermination to racial groups persecuted by the government has become . . .
customary international law.”207 While this is almost certainly an overstatement,
the law has responded to critiques that for many groups, including minorities
and indigenous peoples, internal self-determination is inadequate.208 For while
it in theory purports to increase the level of political participation and
representation within a given mother state, it often tends to disappoint, as many
groups are still forced to work within the confines of the existing structures with
which they have qualms.209 Admittedly, this is both the problem and the aim of
internal self-determination, for even its critics admit that the uncertainty of its
premise is “fraught with danger” and the guideline of working within the bounds
of the already existing state undoubtedly preserves the international status quo,
sometimes for better or for worse.210
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However, there is a very good case for the need to develop the concept into
a more workable instrument to adequately address current international issues.
Clearly the current paradigm of describing self-determination in static terms, or
as legal scholar Howard Vogel put it, “the external/internal dichotomy—is
overly statist in its conception and denies the rich variety of group identity and
claims.”211 Important contributors to this area like James Anaya have recognized
an ill-founded construction on “a set of premises in service of the state rather
than in service of human rights to secure the well-being of human beings.”212
Anaya further subdivides self-determination into “normative strains.”213 The
first, labeled the constitutive aspect, “requires that the governing institutional
order be substantially the creation of processes guided by the will of the people,
or peoples governed.”214 The second, which he terms the on-going aspect,
“requires that the governing institutional order, independently of the processes
leading to its creation or alteration, be one under which people may live and
develop freely on a continuing basis.”215
Former member of the National Security Council Morton Halperin and his
colleagues have called for an abandonment of this external/internal dichotomy
and the adoption of a new framework more apt at distinguishing types of
claims.216 This new framework contains six categories of self-determination:
anti-colonial, sub-state, trans-state, dispersed peoples, indigenous, and
representative.217 While this Comment will not stray far afield into the intricacies
of this theory, the sixth category of this list will be analyzed fully in relation to
the Catalan situation below since Vogel’s theory holds this categorization as
most similar to what is traditionally thought of as internal self-determination.218
All of these calls for an increase in nuance to move beyond this inadequate
external/internal binary highlight the importance of social relatability in modern
international politics. The central ethic of Grotius’ principle of sociability is an
effort towards the, “on-going process to support the flourishing of life in
recognition of our interconnected common humanity.”219 Updating an
211
Howard J. Vogel, Reframing Rights from the Ground Up: The Contribution of the New U.N. Law of
Self-Determination to Recovering the Principle of Sociability on the Way to a Relational Theory of International
Human Rights, 20 TEMP. INT’L L.J. 443, 464 (2006).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
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ineffective paradigm would be a germane decision in what should be an everstriving effort to maintain international amity.
Applying this legal philosophy to the Catalan situation opens new doors of
juridical opportunity for resolving an escalating international emergency.
Firstly, the constitutive element seems to largely be met. Catalans were present
at the founding of the modern Spanish State, with several of their requests made
including the passage of a statute of autonomy granting them significant
amounts of local power.220 It is the “on-going” element that is problematic.
There has been, in the Catalan estimation, a lack of involvement in the
development of the nation of Spain, or a lack of regional say in the direction
with which the nation is headed, and repeated deemphasis on the importance of
Catalan culture. In essence these claims are very similar to those made by the
Quebecois in Canada, highlighting the unique challenges of a multi-lingual and
cultural nation. Similar to the Quebecois, it would seem contrary to the Catalan
position that they, in fact, have received a rather significant degree of
representation, regional autonomy, and even financial and moral support (even
the 1992 Olympic games in Barcelona which elevated the city and forever put it
on the map as a tourist destination was largely funded by the central
government).221 However, distinct from the Quebecois, the Catalans, in the face
of a desire for more regional control, have been met with fierce resistance by the
government, often even physical in nature.
The lack of attention from Madrid, illegal actions taken by the Catalans, and
the subsequent violent governmental response has only further elevated the
problem and alienated both sides. For a peaceful resolution we should look to
Halperin’s theory of representative self-determination. This claim, “results when
the population of an existing state seeks to change its political structure in favor
of a more representative (and preferably democratic) structure.”222 For Catalonia
this could take many forms. An important first step may just be the Spanish
state’s willingness to enter into a dialogue on such matters, legitimizing longignored claims. Next may be the allowance of similar financial competences that
the Basque region holds as this has been a longtime sore spot. Compromise
should be possible. Perhaps one possible solution could be a promise for
Catalonia to be as financially independent as the Basque region by a certain
designated year. This would secure Catalan allegiance to the nation while still
220

ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 229.
Ferran Brunet, An Economic Analysis of the Barcelona ‘92 Olympic Games: Resources, Financing and
Impacts, UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA BARCELONA, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.
617.4939&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
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retaining and actually achieving a greater level of autonomy while
simultaneously avoiding a “Catalexit” situation that would almost inevitably
tank their own economy and destabilize the region, risking a slip into more
violence and unrest. Whatever the solution may end up being, this more nuanced
and detailed approach allows for more grievances to be heard and addressed
without relying on political showmanship, polarization, and destabilization.
To address the kinds of problems groups like the Catalans face, international
law must cease trying to use 20th century tools to address 21st century issues. No
longer are the questions of peoples reserved for a post-colonial context: they
encompass intra-state disputes, loaded with cultural complexity. No longer can
self-determination be matter-of-factly resolved by either remaining within a
mother state or breaking completely. International law must sharpen its tools,
enhance its understanding and classification of these problems, and open the
door to novel solutions that make achieving peace, prosperity, and liberty
possible.
CONCLUSION
The Catalans, while defined by their grueges (struggles) have not been
swallowed by them. In fact, another word has proven a stronger part of the
Catalan character, solidaritat (solidarity223). A longtime theme of the Catalan
people, this word speaks to their sense of communal strength and political
determination (so much so that two political parties have been named after the
word224). Language has been a key theme of this centuries-old fight and it will
hopefully be language and dialogue that resolves it. International law must
evolve its outdated notions to provide workable options for parties to utilize
during complex political dispute negotiation. The perversity of requiring a
degree of oppression for a people to be entitled to certain political rights is a
blunt and brutal legal standard. There must be more options for people simply if
not enough body bags have been filled. This Comment has illustrated some
tensions in international law, why it is necessary for it to take reformative steps,

223
Solidaritat (Catalan), WORDSENSE.EU ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.wordsense.eu/solidarity/
(last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
224
See generally Cu-Cut! Satira politica en temps trasbalsats, AJUNTAMENT BARCELONA (Oct. 2012),
https://www.laselvadelcamp.org/sites/default/files/noticies/full_de_ma_cu_cut.pdf.

SKINNER_7.11.22

424

7/11/2022 10:50 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

and some options for doing so. There is no “correct” side to this crisis, only
varying levels of failure. Hopefully, with new ways of looking at the problems
new solutions will emerge.
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